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C O M M E N T  
The Intercircuit Exclusionary Rule 
introduction 
Imagine that you commit a crime in Connecticut and then return home to 
Puerto Rico where you commit another crime. In the course of investigating the 
second crime (in Puerto Rico), the FBI discovers evidence that implicates you in 
the ﬁrst crime. In light of this evidence, the federal government indicts you for 
the ﬁrst crime, in accordance with venue rules, in the District of Connecticut. At 
trial, you argue that the inculpatory evidence should be suppressed because the 
Second Circuit (the place of the trial) has ruled that similar searches violate the 
Fourth Amendment. The government, by contrast, argues that the evidence 
should be admitted because the First Circuit (the place of the search) has ruled 




For over thirty years, federal district courts have resolved these types of 
cases—call them “intercircuit suppression disputes”—by adopting a location-
based choice-of-law rule: courts apply the precedent of the circuit where the 
search occurred. The choice-of-law approach has been widely followed by lower 
courts and even recognized by a number of criminal procedure treatises.
2
 Nev-
ertheless, this Comment will show that the approach is fundamentally mistaken. 
 
1. For a case with a similar set of facts, see United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 
1987). 
2. See JAMES G. CARR ET AL., 2 LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 7:40 (2018); CLIFFORD S. 
FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 34:32 (2017); see also Ste-
phen L. Harwood, Electronic Surveillance Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 134 (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/criminal/legacy/2010/04/11/elec-srvlnce-issuse
.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFW8-8U9V] (“[T]he governing law should be that of the place 
where the electronic surveillance occurred.”). 
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In some ways, the mistake is understandable. A well-developed literature—
stretching back over ﬁfty years—has long treated interjurisdictional suppression 





  and federal-international
5
  cases. But the existing 
scholarship has yet to consider whether federal-federal suppression cases also 
create a choice-of-law problem.
6
 
This Comment will demonstrate that federal-federal cases do not create a 
choice-of-law problem. The reason is relatively straightforward: circuit splits do 
not create separate bodies of “law” and thus do not implicate choice of law. In-
deed, in other doctrinal contexts, federal courts have recognized that circuit splits 
do not create a choice-of-law problem. And this distinction—between different 
laws and different interpretations of the same law—is well grounded in broader 
choice-of-law theory. Courts should therefore resolve intercircuit suppression 
disputes in the same way that they would any other question of federal law. They 
should either follow vertical precedent or, if there is no binding precedent, they 
should independently interpret the law. 
Admittedly, intercircuit suppression disputes involve one additional compli-
cation. Under the current good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, federal 
courts must also determine whether an officer relied upon local appellate prece-
dent at the time of the search. In other words, before a federal court evaluates a 
search under its own circuit’s precedent, it must ﬁrst evaluate whether the search 
circuit’s precedent authorized the search at issue. And if the search circuit’s prec-
edent did, then the evidence should be admitted regardless of the forum court’s 
interpretation. But to be clear, the good-faith exception is not a choice-of-law 
rule; the forum court still analyzes the officer’s reasonable reliance from its own 
 
3. See John Bernard Corr, State Searches, Federal Cases, and Choice of Law: Just a Little Respect, 23 
PEPP. L. REV. 31 (1995). 
4. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.5(c) (5th ed. 2017); John Bernard Corr, 
Criminal Procedure and the Conﬂict of Laws, 73 GEO. L.J. 1217 (1985); Mary Jane Morrison, 
Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 579 (1988); William H. Theis, Choice of 
Law and the Administration of the Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 1043 
(1977); Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in Another Jurisdiction: 
Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 67 (1975); Megan McGlynn, Note, 
Competing Exclusionary Rules in Multistate Investigations: Resolving Conﬂicts of State Search-and-
Seizure Law, 127 YALE L.J. 406 (2017). 
5. See Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and Sei-
zures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329 (1994); Michael Far-
biarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507, 514-15 (2016). 
6. The sole articles to note federal-federal suppression cases are Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional 
Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1175-77 
(2012), and Mary Jane Morrison, Exclusionary Rule Choice of Law, 17 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. 
REP. 1, 8 (1990). 
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perspective. Instead, the good-faith exception simply recognizes that the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served by suppressing evidence ac-
quired by an officer who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon binding 
precedent. 
In light of these two insights—about circuit splits and the good-faith excep-
tion—this Comment proposes a new framework for resolving intercircuit sup-
pression disputes. The framework has three steps: ﬁrst, the forum court deter-
mines whether the officers reasonably relied upon locally binding precedent at 
the time of the search; second, if the officers did not, the forum court determines 
whether its own circuit has binding precedent that resolves the question; and 
third, if the circuit does not, the forum court independently determines the 
meaning of federal law. This framework rests upon sounder doctrinal and theo-
retical footing than the current choice-of-law approach. And the framework 
would change the outcome of suppression disputes in certain cases, such as when 
the search circuit would suppress the evidence but the forum circuit would not. 
In defending this framework, this Comment also makes a broader theoretical 
contribution to the choice-of-law literature. Courts and scholars have long as-
sumed that circuit splits do not create a choice-of-law question but have failed 
to provide a transsubstantive account of why they do not.
7
 This Comment offers 
such an account by showing that the presence of separate laws—rather than just 
different interpretations of the same law—is a necessary prerequisite to a choice-
of-law problem. And in doing so, this Comment explains why federal courts 
should never resolve circuit splits—even outside of the exclusionary rule con-
text—by resorting to choice-of-law rules. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the existing choice-
of-law approach to resolving intercircuit suppression disputes. Part II then 
shows that the choice-of-law approach conﬂicts with existing doctrine and 
choice-of-law theory. Part III argues that the current good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule most likely requires courts to account for another circuit’s prec-
edent in determining whether an officer reasonably relied upon a binding inter-
pretation of the law. Finally, Part IV combines these insights into a three-step 
framework for resolving intercircuit suppression cases. 
 
7. An exception is Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Domestic Splits of Authority and Interstate Choice of Law, 
29 GONZ. L. REV. 521 (1994). But Rensberger’s article focuses on the importance of separate 
sovereigns rather than of separate laws. See id. at 568-73; see also infra notes 70-72 and accom-
panying text (discussing the limits of the separate-sovereign account). 
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i .  the federal exclusionary rule as a choice-of-law 
problem  
Thirty years ago, in United States v. Gerena,
8
 a federal district court ruled for 
the ﬁrst time that intercircuit suppression disputes present a choice-of-law ques-
tion. The facts of Gerena are essentially those presented in the Introduction: the 
defendant robbed a bank in Connecticut, but the FBI acquired key evidence for 
the case through a wiretap located in Puerto Rico. When faced with the question 
of which circuit’s precedent should apply, the district court ruled that intercircuit 
suppression disputes are controlled by “the law of the place where [the allegedly 
illegal search] occurred.”
9
 Gerena is signiﬁcant for being not only the ﬁrst, but 
also the most in-depth, discussion of the application of choice-of-law principles 
to federal circuit conﬂicts over the exclusionary rule. Indeed, subsequent deci-
sions adopting Gerena’s choice-of-law approach have generally cited its holding 
with little independent analysis.
10
 
In support of its choice-of-law approach, the court in Gerena ﬁrst turned to 
the Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws. The court began by quoting the Re-
statement’s claim that “Conﬂict of Laws covers an extremely wide area, embracing 
all situations where the affairs of men cut across state lines.”
11
 The Restatement, 
the court further observed, deﬁnes “state” as “any ‘territorial unit with a distinct 
general body of law’ and is expressly not limited according to notions of sover-
eignty or political boundaries.”
12
 Based on the Restatement’s broad deﬁnitions, 
the court reasoned that circuit splits may constitute a form of state-state conﬂict 
as “the states are in a position roughly similar to that of the circuits.”
13
 
The court next noted that “the law of a state is also broadly deﬁned to include 
‘the body of standards, principles and rules.’”
14
 “Accordingly,” it concluded that 
 
8. 667 F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 1987). 
9. Id. at 924. 
10. Technically, Gerena considered the exclusionary rule prescribed by the federal wiretap statute 
rather than the Fourth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982). Title III could raise distinct 
questions about the scope of the exclusionary rule. See Gerena, 667 F. Supp. at 914-16. But 
subsequent decisions have applied the court’s choice-of-law reasoning to suppression cases 
more broadly. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
11. 667 F. Supp. at 919 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 1971)). 
12. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1971)). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)). 
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“‘law’ may properly include differing ‘interpretations’ of the law.”
15
 Or put an-
other way, the court decided that circuit precedent should be thought of as “law,” 
subject to choice-of-law principles. 
Finally, the court pointed out that the Restatement recognizes “intrastate” 
conﬂicts.
16
 Speciﬁcally, the court noted that the Restatement treats conﬂicts that 
arise when the subdivisions of a state, including “counties, cities, towns and vil-
lages[,] . . . have their own separate law and courts” as “analogous to those dealt 
with in the Restatement.”
17
 The court then analogized the Restatement’s under-
standing of “intrastate conﬂicts”—which the court presumed included differing 
interpretations of state law—to “intrafederal” conﬂicts in the form of circuit 
splits.
18
 “To the extent that each circuit has its own body of binding precedent,” 
the court concluded, “then, in the absence of authoritative Supreme Court dis-
position of the particular issue in question, differences among the circuits give 
rise to intrafederal disputes and thus genuine conﬂicts within the general mean-
ing of conﬂict of laws analysis.”
19
 
In addition to discussing the Restatement, Gerena cited two key federal prec-
edents to support its view of intercircuit choice of law. First, the court noted that 
in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
20
 the Second Circuit deferred to a Sixth Cir-
cuit decision holding that there is no inheritable right to publicity under Tennes-
see law. The Second Circuit gave “conclusive deference” to the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Tennessee law in large part because Tennessee is located within 
the Sixth Circuit.
21
 Gerena took Factors to stand for the broader proposition that 
federal courts should apply the precedent of the circuit from which a case 
arises.
22
 In addition, the court cited United States v. Buck,
23
 another Second Cir-
cuit decision in which the court of appeals ruled that evidence from an illegal 
search in New Jersey should not be suppressed because the officers had acted in 
good faith at the time of the search.
24
 Gerena emphasized, however, that the Sec-
 
15. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971)). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). 
21. Id. at 279, 283. 
22. See Gerena, 667 F. Supp. at 922. 
23. 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987). 
24. Id. at 593. 
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ond Circuit made its own determination “only after ﬁnding that the Third Cir-
cuit had not addressed the issue at bar.”
25
 In other words, the court appeared to 
read Buck as implicitly following the precedent of the search circuit. 
In the past thirty years, nearly every district court to address an intercircuit 
suppression case has adopted Gerena’s choice-of-law rule.
26
 And the courts of 
appeal have shed little additional light on the matter. Appellate courts have either 
summarily affirmed district court decisions without elaborating on the choice-
of-law question,
27
 ignored the question in applying the precedent of the forum 
circuit,
28
 or dismissed the issue in a cursory footnote.
29
 
But notwithstanding this indifference, intercircuit suppression disputes mat-
ter. For one thing, these disputes have the potential to arise in a wide range of 
cases. Indeed, the issue can come up any time the federal government conducts 
a search in one circuit and tries the case in another circuit.
30
 Given the interstate 
 
25. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. at 922. 
26. See United States v. Warras, No. 2:13-CR-439-LDG-VCF, 2015 WL 6736981, at *5 n.4 (D. Nev. 
May 18, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:13-CR-00439-KJD-VCF, 2015 WL 
6755275 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2015); United States v. Kennedy, No. CRIM. 13-240, 2014 WL 
6090409, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2014); Recommended Decision on Motions to Suppress, 
United States v. Gates, No. CRIM. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 
2008), aff ’d, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Barragan, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015 
(S.D. Ind. 2008); United States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001); United 
States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 225, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); see also United States v. Kurniawan, 
No. 12 CR 376, 2013 WL 180412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013) (analyzing the case under both 
Second and Ninth Circuit precedent); United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180, 191-92 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that following the precedent of the place of the search is “sensible,” 
but applying Second Circuit precedent because “[w]here the parties do not raise the conﬂicts 
issue, it is appropriate to apply the law of the circuit in which the motion to suppress is 
made”); United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266, 1302 n.11 (D. Mass. 1991) (predicting that 
a district court in Connecticut would apply First Circuit precedent when a search occurred in 
Massachusetts). The sole case to have diverged from Gerena distinguished Gerena rather than 
challenge the choice-of-law approach. See United States v. Rohlsen, 968 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 
(D.V.I. 1997) (distinguishing Gerena because “[t]he courts and judges of the [search circuit] 
have no interest or involvement in [the evidence] or the prosecution of these defendants”), 
aff ’d mem. sub nom. United States v. Riviere, 185 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table 
decision). 
27. See United States v. Kurniawan, 627 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Ozuna, 48 F. 
App’x 739 (11th Cir. 2002). 
28. See United States v. Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1989). 
29. See Gates, 709 F.3d at 62 n.2 (“The parties squabble over whether Fourth Circuit precedents, 
rather than First Circuit precedents, should apply to this issue. This contretemps suggests a 
false dichotomy: the legitimacy of a Terry stop is a matter of federal constitutional law. Geog-
raphy does not matter.”). 
30. See Logan, supra note 6, at 1175-76. 
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focus of federal criminal law, we should expect intercircuit cases to be relatively 
common.
31
 And they are likely to increase in frequency as new technologies 
erode the signiﬁcance of traditional jurisdictional boundaries.
32
 To be sure, this 
Comment has only identiﬁed a handful of cases that directly address the issue. 
But these decisions likely understate the incidence of the problem as courts often 
address choice-of-law questions in unpublished or oral decisions.
33
 
Moreover, the way in which courts resolve intercircuit suppression disputes 
matters. Recent scholarship has found that the Fourth Amendment has proved 
particularly divisive in the lower courts, giving rise to dozens of circuit splits.
34
 
And when an intercircuit suppression dispute arises between circuits with dif-
ferent precedents, the court’s choice-of-law rule can be outcome determinative. 
Admittedly, in every reported intercircuit suppression case where the choice-of-
law approach was applied, courts have concluded that the two circuits agreed on 
the legal issue. In conﬂict of laws, such cases are called “false conﬂicts” because 
the two jurisdictions would decide the case in the same way.
35
 Put another way, 
a false conﬂict means that the court’s choice of law doesn’t practically matter. But 
given the frequencies with which federal criminal investigations extend across 
multiple circuits and with which lower courts disagree over the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, we should expect a “true conﬂict”—a case in which the ju-
risdictions disagree as to the right result—to arise in the future. And when it 
does, the court should decide the suppression question correctly. 
Finally, intercircuit suppression disputes give us an opportunity to consider 
a broader question—one with important theoretical implications for choice of 
law and practical implications for the federal system: do different lower-court 
precedents create a choice-of-law problem? The answer to that question may 
affect not only how courts address circuit splits in the Fourth Amendment con-
text but also how they treat circuit splits more generally. 
 
31. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 
1177 (1997). 
32. See McGlynn, supra note 4, at 411. 
33. See Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 247, 257-58 (2007) (reviewing SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN 
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2006)) (noting that published 
decisions do not fully account for how choice of law actually operates on the ground); see also 
Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 989-
94 (2008) (same). 
34. See Logan, supra note 6, at 1195-1203. 
35. See Peter Kay Westen, False Conﬂicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76-77 (1967). 
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i i .  federal circuit splits and choice of law  
This Part will explain why federal circuit splits do not create a choice-of-law 
problem. For one thing, in most other areas of federal law, courts have already 
concluded that circuit splits do not create a choice-of-law question. The federal 
exclusionary rule cases are thus an unjustiﬁed exception to the general rule. For 
another, as a matter of choice-of-law theory, it makes little sense to treat inter-
pretive disagreements among lower courts as creating a choice-of-law problem. 
Indeed, the core requirement for having a choice-of-law problem—separate 
laws—is not present in intercircuit suppression disputes, which merely involve 
different interpretations of the same law. 
A. Federal Circuit Splits 
In other areas, federal courts have rejected the notion that circuit splits im-
plicate choice of law.
36
 For over a century, courts and scholars have suggested 
that federal judges have an independent duty to determine the meaning of fed-
eral law within the constraints of vertical precedent. And since the 1980s, this 
view has become widely accepted.
37
 
When Congress created the modern federal courts of appeals in 1891,
38
 it left 
open whether circuit courts should determine federal law independently of one 
another. But within a decade, the Supreme Court resolved the question by hold-
ing that circuit courts are not bound by each other’s rulings.
39
 On the contrary, 
the Court observed that, although “comity” might persuade a circuit in some 
cases to follow a sister circuit’s ruling, in most cases “the primary duty of every 





36. See, e.g., Meeks v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 738 F.2d 748, 751 (6th Cir. 1984) (“There are, however, 
no choice of law rules for intercircuit conﬂicts.”); Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 
1962) (noting that federal circuit splits do not present a “true conﬂict of laws problem”). 
37. An exception is Sanford Casut-Ellenbogen, Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit 
Conﬂicts Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1078 (1984), which argues that federal courts should use 
choice-of-law rules to address the problem of unresolved circuit splits. 
38. See Judiciary (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
39. See Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900). 
40. Id.; see also Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 
413 (1972) (“One circuit will follow another or others when it is persuaded, has no strong 
views either way, or considers immediate nationwide uniformity to be unusually important, 
but generally not when it ﬁrmly believes the other circuit or circuits have been wrong.”). 
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Richard Marcus has called this view—that federal courts must independently 
interpret the law—the “principle of competence.”
41
 Marcus developed the prin-
ciple of competence to address a similar question to the one addressed here: 
whether federal courts should follow each other’s precedents when federal cases 
are transferred between circuits for venue reasons. Before Marcus’s article, some 
federal courts had adopted a choice-of-law rule that they were bound to apply 
the precedent of the circuit in which the case originated—a territorial rule similar 
to the one followed by courts in intercircuit suppression cases.
42
 But according 
to the principle of competence, when deciding questions of federal law, “federal 
courts have not only the power but the duty to decide correctly.”
43
 In fact, Marcus 
argued that “[i]f a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of another cir-
cuit without addressing the merits, it is not doing its job.”
44
 
Soon after Marcus published his article, the D.C. Circuit drew upon the prin-
ciple of competence in deciding what would become the seminal case on choice 
of law in federal-question transfer cases. In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sep-
tember 1, 1983, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that courts in transfer cases 
should “be free to decide a federal claim in the manner it views as correct without 
deferring” to the circuit in which the case ﬁrst arose.
45
 
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion relied in large part upon a formalist principle—
that federal law is unitary—in concluding that circuit splits do not present a 
question of choice of law. She noted, for instance, that “federal courts comprise 
a single system [in which each tribunal endeavors to apply] a single body of 
law.”
46
 Furthermore, in Korean Air Lines, lawsuits from a number of different cir-
cuits had been consolidated into a single court for pretrial proceedings. As a re-
sult, treating different circuit precedents as different laws subject to choice-of-
law principles, in Judge Ginsburg’s view, would force multidistrict judges into 
the “logically inconsistent” position of “simultaneously [applying] different and 




41. Richard L. Marcus, Conﬂicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 
YALE L.J. 677, 702 (1984). 
42. See id. at 692 n.100 (citing cases). 
43. Id. at 702. 
44. Id. 
45. 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Marcus, supra note 41, at 721), aff ’d sub nom. 
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). 
46. Id. at 1175 (quoting H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962)) (alteration 
in original). 
47. Id. at 1175-76. 
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Since Korean Air Lines, lower federal courts have uniformly followed the 
principle of competence in applying their own precedent in federal-question 
transfer cases.
48
  Indeed, Marcus’s article and Judge Ginsburg’s opinion have 
been so inﬂuential that lower courts have followed the approach in other con-
texts. For example, when federal courts issue a subpoena for a case pending in 
another circuit, they apply their own circuit’s precedent, notwithstanding at-
tempts by litigants to convince these courts to adopt a choice-of-law approach.
49
 
Of course, we all realize that “the uniformity of federal law is . . . a myth.”
50
 
Indeed, one reason that litigants engage in “forum shopping” in the federal sys-
tem is because they realize that circuits can have different precedents.
51
 For prac-
tical purposes, these circuits have different bodies of law. But even if the uni-
formity of federal law is a myth, it is a myth that federal courts have come to 
believe they “are required to accept.”
52
 
Although the principle of competence directs courts to make an independent 
determination of the meaning of federal law, federal courts are also still con-
strained by rules of hierarchical precedent. Setting aside whether some rules of 
vertical precedent may be constitutionally required,
53
 there are a number of con-
sequentialist justiﬁcations for following hierarchical precedent, including judi-
cial economy, the avoidance of delayed justice, and the greater proﬁciency of su-
perior courts.
54
 In other words, most scholars believe that, at the very least, 
“efficiency concerns require the application of the law of the court with appellate 
 
48. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 703, 705-06, 731-32 (1995) (documenting the inﬂuence of Korean Air Lines); Larry D. 
Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado 
Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 566 (2004) (documenting the inﬂu-
ence of Marcus’s article). 
49. See Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Highland Tank 
& Mfg. Co. v. PS Int’l, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 239, 244 (W.D. Pa. 2007); New York v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL 649492, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2002); In re 
Ramaekers, 33 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
50. Ragazzo, supra note 48, at 736. 
51. Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 
NEB. L. REV. 79, 99-102 (1999). 
52. Ragazzo, supra note 48, at 738. 
53. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 817, 828 (1994). 
54. See id. at 839-49; Ragazzo, supra note 48, at 739. 




 This limitation on the principle of competence should come as no 
surprise as vertical precedent is a widely accepted aspect of our judicial system.
56
 
The principle of competence—and its application in federal-question trans-
fer cases—helps us realize Gerena’s choice-of-law mistake. Federal courts should 
not adopt a choice-of-law rule to resolve circuit splits over the exclusionary rule 
because they have an independent obligation to determine the meaning of fed-
eral law within the bounds of vertical precedent. Whatever the merits of Gerena’s 
choice-of-law approach at the time of the decision, subsequent developments 
have signiﬁcantly eroded the logic of the approach, rendering the case a doctrinal 
outlier. 
In addition, the principle of competence can even explain the Second Cir-
cuit’s seemingly contrary decision in Factors (upon which Gerena relied). First, 
although Marcus would apply the principle of competence to questions of state 
law,
57
 lower courts and even the Supreme Court have often deferred to the local 
circuit courts on questions of state law because these local circuits “are better 
schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.”
58
 But 
federal courts do not defer to each other on questions of federal law because 
courts perceive themselves to be equally competent to interpret federal law.
59
 
Thus, Factors may simply be a state-law exception to the principle of competence. 
In addition, even if this state-law distinction is not entirely satisfying, the Factors 
rule is at least a lesser deviation from the principle of competence because it is a 
deference rule, not a choice-of-law rule. That is, under Factors, courts can still 
disagree with local circuit precedent if they think it “clearly misread[s] state 
 
55. Ragazzo, supra note 48, at 743. 
56. See Caminker, supra note 53, at 818. 
57. See Marcus, supra note 41, at 704 n.166. 
58. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150 (2017) (quoting Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 (1985)); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating 
Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975 
(2004) (defending this rule). 
59. There appears to be one exception to this rule. The Federal Circuit defers to other circuit 
courts on questions of substantive and procedural law outside of its specialized jurisdiction. 
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1791, 
1843-44 (2013). We might distinguish the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule under a similar 
theory of comparative expertise. Or we might think that the Federal Circuit’s rule is itself 
wrong. Notably, scholars have long criticized the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law doctrine 
based on the principle of competence. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 38 & n.220, 59-61 (1989); Joan E. 
Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 
1204-06 (1996). 




 By contrast, a choice-of-law rule requires a complete abdication of the 
principle of competence. The court does not defer to another circuit’s precedent 
but follows it absolutely. 
B. Choice of Law 
The existing doctrinal view that federal circuit splits do not implicate choice 
of law also makes sense as a matter of choice-of-law theory.
61
 There are two 
problems with treating circuit splits as a choice-of-law problem. First, scholars 
have historically assumed that choice-of-law questions only arise when two sep-
arate sovereigns have a relationship to the case, and circuit splits do not involve 
separate sovereigns. Admittedly, the separate-sovereigns view is incomplete. 
Modern scholarship recognizes that choice-of-law issues can also arise within a 
single sovereign when two different laws could be applied to a case. But even 
under this second broader view, circuit splits do not create a choice-of-law prob-
lem because circuit splits do not involve formally separate laws. 
Both historical and modern approaches to choice of law have treated sover-
eignty as a key factor in the creation of a choice-of-law problem. Indeed, past 
scholarship has used the presence of multiple sovereigns to distinguish domestic 
splits of authority from classic choice-of-law problems.
62
 The Restatement (First) 
of Conﬂict of Laws, for example, prescribed a number of territorial choice-of-law 
rules that focused on the place where the activity occurred. The theory was that 
“the only law that could operate in a foreign territory was the law of the foreign 
sovereign,” and therefore, “[w]hen an event . . . occurred in a foreign territory, a 
right was created” based on the law of that sovereign.
63
 In other words, the First 





60. Abex Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro 
Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981)) (emphasis omitted). 
61. It should not be surprising that Korean Air Lines reﬂects broader choice-of-law principles, as 
its author, Judge Ginsburg, taught Conﬂict of Laws when she was a law professor. See Herma 
Hill Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2, 11 (2004). 
62. See Rensberger, supra note 7, at 568-73; see also Lea Brilmayer, The Other State’s Interests, 24 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 234 (1991) (deﬁning choice of law in terms of separate sovereigns). 
63. William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conﬂict of Laws on the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 
1196, 1197 (1997). 
64. James Audley McLaughlin, Conﬂict of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci Doctrine, the Beguiling 
Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 957, 960 (1991). 
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Modern choice-of-law approaches have moved away from notions of exclu-
sive territorial sovereignty but have retained an emphasis on multiple sovereigns. 
The Second Restatement, for instance, begins by explaining that choice-of-law 
rules are “necessary” because “[t]he world is composed of territorial states hav-
ing separate and differing systems of law”
65
 and that “[p]roblems arise when 
legally signiﬁcant aspects of a case are divided between two or more states.”
66
 The 
Second Restatement deﬁnes “state”—like the First Restatement—as “a territorial 
unit with a distinct general body of law.”
67
 
In contrast to the states, the federal system is typically understood as com-
prising a single sovereign. The Second Restatement, for example, describes the 
United States as “a state . . . as to matters that are governed by federal law.”
68
 And 
in a related context, Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed that “[n]o limitations 
on sovereignty come into play in federal courts . . . [because] [the United States] 
is one sovereign, the same ‘judicial Power,’ whether the court sits in Indianapolis 
or Alexandria.”
69
 Thus, under the separate-sovereigns account, circuit splits do 
not create a choice-of-law problem. 
Yet the separate-sovereigns account is incomplete. Many modern scholars 
now believe that “intrastate” or “domestic” conﬂicts should also be understood 
in terms of choice of law. Domestic conﬂicts can arise in two contexts. First, as 
Gerena noted, conﬂicts can arise when different subdivisions of the same sover-
eign—such as different cities—have separate laws.
70
 Or they can arise when mul-
tiple laws within the same sovereign have overlapping application.
71
 For exam-
ple, scholars have described conﬂicts between the Federal Arbitration Act and 
 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
66. Id. § 1 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
67. Compare id. § 3, with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
The comment cited by Gerena that “states” are “expressly not limited according to notions of 
sovereignty or political boundaries” is not to the contrary. The comment merely draws a dis-
tinction between the meaning of “state” for the purposes of conﬂict of laws and the meaning 
of “state” under foreign relations law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971). A politically sovereign unit in foreign relations law can “engage[] 
in foreign relations and assume[] responsibility for its acts in such relations.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 4 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). In contrast, a state 
within the United States cannot. See, e.g., Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Reme-
dies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 414 (2018). 
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (emphasis 
added). 
69. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 
(7th Cir. 2000) (describing sovereignty for purposes of personal jurisdiction). 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
71. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 283 (1990). 
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other federal statutes as giving rise to a choice-of-law problem.
72
 In summary, 
under the modern view, a choice-of-law problem arises when two separate laws 
can be applied to a case—whether the laws come from separate sovereigns or a 
single sovereign. 
But even under the modern view, circuit conﬂicts cannot be treated as a 
choice-of-law problem because different circuit precedents do not create for-
mally separate laws. As Stephen Sachs has aptly noted, “We might talk about a 
particular search-and-seizure ruling as ‘the law of the Fourth Circuit,’ but we 
don’t actually think that the Fourth Amendment requires different things in 
Maryland than it does in Delaware.”
73
 We likewise should not think that choice-
of-law principles require a federal district court in Maryland to apply the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Choice of law has long embraced this reasoning in its treatment of interme-
diate appellate precedent. Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement, 
noted as much in his Treatise on the Conﬂict of Laws, published a year after the 
First Restatement.
74
 Speciﬁcally, Beale observed that “it is entirely possible that 
the intermediate appellate court of one district should decide the law in one way 
while the corresponding court in another district of the state decides it in the 
opposite way.”
75
 But he emphasized that “[i]t cannot be said that there come to 
be two or more legal units in the state”; instead, the law simply “remains indef-
inite” until the disagreement is resolved.
76
 Likewise, when two circuits disagree 
 
72. See Andrew D. Bradt, Resolving Intrastate Conﬂicts of Laws: The Example of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 603 (2015). 
73. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 817, 861 
(2015). 
74. See JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). 
75. Id. § 3.3. 
76. Id. Beale’s Treatise also shows that Gerena was wrong to read “standards, principles and rules” 
as suggesting that different lower-court interpretations of the law are also “law.” These terms 
in the Second Restatement come from the First Restatement. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). And Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement, deﬁned 
“principles . . . [as] general premises of law which can be used for deduction and for analogy”; 
“standard[s] . . . [as] rule[s] which [are] stated as a degree of a continuously changing series 
to be reached, in order for a legal result to follow”; and “rule[s] [as] . . . statement[s] of law 
applicable only to a narrowly deﬁned class of cases and incapable of extension by deduction 
or analogy.” BEALE, supra note 74, § 3.2. In other words, none of these terms necessarily refer 
to lower-court interpretations of the law. 
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as to the meaning of federal law, federal law simply “remains indeﬁnite” until 
the Supreme Court settles the question.
77
 
More recently, scholars have argued that most choice-of-law problems raise 
“ordinary questions of statutory interpretation.”
78
 This view of choice of law—
ﬁrst proposed by Brainerd Currie, the father of modern conﬂict-of-laws analysis, 
and soon to be adopted in the Third Restatement—instructs courts to ﬁrst deter-
mine the scope and content of the relevant laws at issue using ordinary principles 
of interpretation.
79
 Courts engage in this analysis because in many cases, one law 
does not grant the parties any rights and, thus, there is no conﬂict.
80
 
But under the statutory-interpretation approach, it makes little sense to treat 
circuit splits as raising a choice-of-law question because circuit splits do not in-
volve separate laws whose scope and content can be interpreted. Instead, circuit 
splits simply involve an interpretive disagreement over the meaning of theoreti-
cally uniform federal law.
81
 In contrast, other domestic cases—such as conﬂicts 
between different municipal laws and conﬂicts between different federal stat-
utes—can raise choice-of-law questions because they involve formally separate 
laws that can be separately interpreted. 
This distinction may seem formalistic (perhaps even simplistic). But the idea 
of separate laws is at the heart of both historical choice-of-law analysis—which 
required separate sovereigns and thus necessarily involved separate laws—as 
well as more modern approaches. 
i i i . the good-faith exception and reliance on circuit 
precedent  
The previous Part offered a general account of why circuit conﬂicts do not 
create a choice-of-law problem. This Part, by comparison, considers an issue 
 
77. See Stephen E. Sachs, Precedent and the Semblance of Law, 33 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 16), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170047 (noting that “the law of the cir-
cuit . . . stands in for the actual law,” but that “if someone argued that a federal statute really 
had different legal content in Maryland than in Delaware, we’d call them crazy; that’s just not 
how the American legal system works”). 
78. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Brainerd Currie’s Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking Back, 
Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 509 (2014). Of course, this approach is not without 
its critics. See Lea Brilmayer, What I Like Most About the Restatement (Second) of Conﬂicts of 
Law and Why It Should Not Be Thrown Out with the Bathwater, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 144 (2016). 
79. See Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 512; Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan Jones, What a Third Re-
statement of Conﬂict of Laws Can Do, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 139, 142-43 (2016). 
80. See Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 511. 
81. See Ragazzo, supra note 48, at 736-38. 
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unique to intercircuit suppression cases: the good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. The good-faith exception is one area where the forum court should 
consider the precedent of another circuit because suppression is not allowed 
when an officer reasonably relied upon local appellate precedent. In other words, 
if the precedent of the search circuit would have permitted the search, then the 
forum court should not suppress the evidence. 
The modern federal exclusionary rule is based on a single rationale: deter-
rence.
82
 As a consequence, over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a number of “good-faith exceptions” to the rule that unlawfully obtained 
evidence will be suppressed. Simply put, even if a law-enforcement officer con-
ducts an unconstitutional search, courts will suppress the evidence only when 
the police are “sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid 
by the justice system.”
83
 
In Davis v. United States,
84
 the Supreme Court extended the good-faith ex-
ception to reliance on local circuit precedent. In Davis, the Alabama police per-
formed a search that was lawful under Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of 
the search. But while the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in a sep-
arate proceeding that the type of search at issue in Davis violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
85
 The Court in Davis thus had to resolve whether evidence should 
be suppressed when the officers had acted in “objectively reasonable reliance on 
binding judicial precedent” that was later overruled.
86
 
The Court began by emphasizing that suppression is neither “a personal con-
stitutional right” nor a remedy “designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an 
unconstitutional search.”
87
 Instead, “[t]he rule’s sole purpose . . . is to deter fu-
ture Fourth Amendment violations,” a purpose whose value must be balanced 
against “the ‘substantial social costs’” of exclusion.
88
 The Court next observed 
that its prior cases had arrived at the “basic insight . . . that the deterrence bene-
ﬁts of exclusion ‘var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at 
issue.”
89
 In cases where officers had acted in “reasonable reliance” on an invalid 
 
82. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). 
83. Id. at 144. 
84. 564 U.S. 229 (2012). 
85. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
86. Davis, 564 U.S. at 238-39. 
87. Id. at 236 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). 
88. Id. at 236-37 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
89. Id. at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)). 
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warrant or statute, the Court had previously concluded that there would be in-




Within the particular context of Davis, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
“[a]n officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent 
does no more than ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act.’”
91
 As a 
result, excluding evidence under these circumstances would merely deter officers 
from “do[ing] [their] duty,” which “is not the kind of deterrence the exclusion-
ary rule seeks to foster.”
92
 The Court therefore held that evidence should not be 
suppressed when the police had acted in objectively reasonable reliance on bind-
ing circuit precedent. 
The Court’s holding in Davis should logically apply not only when prece-
dents change over time, but also when precedents vary across jurisdictions. Put 
another way, if an officer performs a search that was authorized under binding 
precedent where the search occurred, then the evidence should not be suppressed 
even if the case is eventually brought in a circuit that would otherwise exclude 
it. Indeed, one district court has already found that good-faith reliance on circuit 
precedent is relevant to intercircuit suppression disputes, although that court 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis can also help us reconcile the princi-
ple of competence with the Second Circuit’s decision in Buck (upon which Gerena 
also relied). Recall that in Buck, the Second Circuit had addressed the exclusion-
ary rule question “only after ﬁnding that the Third Circuit had not addressed the 
issue at bar.”
94
 Rather than representing a choice-of-law determination, the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision to look ﬁrst at Third Circuit precedent is best understood 
in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Davis. The court in Buck 
ﬁrst had to determine whether the Third Circuit had addressed the legal issue in 
order to assess whether the officers could have acted in good-faith reliance on 
binding circuit precedent. 
 
90. Id. at 238-39. 
91. Id. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920) (second alteration in original). 
92. Id. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920) (ﬁrst alteration in original). 
93. See United States v. Kennedy, No. CRIM. 13-240, 2014 WL 6090409, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 
2014) (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-37 and United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180, 191 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995)). Ironically, the district court invoked Davis even though the search-circuit 
precedent was “more favorable” to the defendant. Id. Given that the good-faith exception is 
about excusing police misconduct, it makes little sense to apply the search circuit’s precedent 
under Davis in order to beneﬁt the defendant. See infra Part IV. 
94. United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 922 (D. Conn. 1987) (citing United States v. 
Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
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The good-faith exception thus represents one deviation from the rule that 
courts should decide cases according to their local circuit precedent or independ-
ent judgment. Together, the principle of competence and the good-faith excep-
tion can provide us with a new framework for resolving intercircuit suppression 
disputes. 
iv. the intercircuit exclusionary rule 
My prior discussion of the principle of competence and choice of law applies 
to federal circuit splits more broadly. As a general matter, federal courts should 
never use choice-of-law rules to resolve circuit splits. But in this ﬁnal Part, I will 
focus on intercircuit suppression disputes. This Part describes a three-step 
framework for resolving such cases—what I will call the “intercircuit exclusion-
ary rule.” 
The three-step framework is as follows: First, the court should determine 
whether the search was clearly authorized by the precedent of the circuit in which 
the search occurred. If it was, then the court should rule the evidence admissible 
under the good-faith exception. If it was not, then the court should proceed to 
the second step. Second, the court should determine whether its own circuit’s 
precedent clearly dictates the outcome. If it does, then the court should follow 
that precedent. If its circuit’s precedent is unclear, the court should proceed to 
the third step. Third, if neither of the ﬁrst two questions resolve the issue, then 
the court should use its independent judgment to decide the issue. 
The ﬁrst step is simply an application of Davis to differences in precedent 
across space rather than time. If an officer acts in reliance on binding local ap-
pellate precedent, then under Davis, there is no deterrent beneﬁt to suppressing 
the evidence. Note, however, that in this context, courts are not applying the 
precedent of another circuit as a matter of choice of law. Instead, they are simply 
following the Supreme Court’s analysis of the good-faith exception by admitting 
evidence that does not further the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
The second step follows from current principles of vertical stare decisis. Be-
cause intercircuit cases do not create a choice-of-law question, legal or prudential 
considerations weigh in favor of courts following the precedent of their own cir-
cuit. 
Finally, the third step is based upon the principle of competence. In the ab-
sence of the good-faith exception or binding forum precedent, courts should 
reach their best understanding of federal law—that is, the interpretation that, “in 




95. Marcus, supra note 41, at 702 n.154. 
the intercircuit exclusionary rule 
249 
There are two principal differences between the existing rule and my pro-
posed rule. First, under the existing choice-of-law approach, the search circuit’s 
precedent always applies. By contrast, under my proposed approach, the search 
circuit’s precedent is relevant only when it authorizes the search because that is 
the only context in which the good-faith exception is implicated. Second, under 
the existing rule, the forum circuit’s precedent never applies. By contrast, under 
my proposed rule, the forum court will usually apply its own precedent or, in the 
alternative, its independent judgment. 
In some cases, the existing rule and my proposed rule result in the same out-
come; in others, the outcomes diverge. Consider again the facts of Gerena.
96
 In 
the actual case, the defendant argued that precedent from the Second Circuit 
(the forum circuit) required the evidence to be suppressed, while the govern-
ment argued that precedent from the First Circuit (the search circuit) allowed 
the evidence to be admitted. In this case, under either approach, the result would 
be the same: the evidence should be admitted. Under the choice-of-law rule, the 
court would adopt the First Circuit’s precedent and admit the evidence. And un-
der the intercircuit exclusionary rule, the court would apply the good-faith ex-
ception and admit the evidence. 
But now imagine that the circuits ﬂipped precedents—that is, the Second 
Circuit would admit the evidence and the First Circuit would suppress it. In this 
case, the two rules diverge. Under the choice-of-law rule, the court would adopt 
the First Circuit’s precedent and would suppress the evidence. By contrast, under 
the intercircuit exclusionary rule, the court would apply its own circuit’s prece-
dent and would admit the evidence. 
In addition, the rules can also differ in cases where either the forum circuit’s 
or search circuit’s precedent is unclear. Under the existing choice-of-law rule, 
courts would likely have to predict how the search circuit would rule if the par-
ticular legal question has not yet been resolved by that circuit.
97
 The notion of 
one circuit predicting how another circuit will rule may seem strange. Indeed, it 
was partially this very strangeness that led to the rejection of a choice-of-law 
approach in federal transfer cases.
98
 By contrast, under my proposed rule, if the 
search circuit’s precedent does not authorize the search, courts would either fol-




96. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
97. See Logan, supra note 6, at 1176. 
98. See Marcus, supra note 41, at 714. 
99. It is true that lower courts have disagreed about what it means for a prior decision to authorize 
a search. See David J. Twombly, Note, The Good-Faith Exception and Unsettled Law: A Study of 
GPS Tracking Cases After United States v. Jones, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 821-28 (2013). But this 
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To be sure, this rule may appear unduly harsh to defendants because the 
precedent of another circuit only applies when it favors the government—that is, 
when it makes the evidence admissible. Indeed, Gerena cited the interests of de-
fendants in “the preservation of their civil liberties and the vindication of their 
rights” as a reason for adopting the search-precedent rule.
100
 But as noted before, 
the modern exclusionary rule is grounded in the single rationale of deterrence. 
“[T]he exclusionary rule,” as the Supreme Court has emphasized, “is not an in-
dividual right.”
101
 In traditional choice-of-law cases, courts might think about 
where a legal right “vests” in deciding whether to apply a foreign body of law.
102
 
But even if intercircuit suppression disputes created a choice-of-law question 
(which they do not), courts would not be allowed to consider the defendant’s 
interests when choosing among federal exclusionary rule precedents. Instead, 




Once we recall the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the apparent 
harshness of my proposed framework becomes more understandable. Imagine 
ﬁrst that evidence is admissible in the search circuit but inadmissible in the fo-
rum circuit. The reason that the evidence should be admitted is that, per Davis, 
suppressing the evidence would not serve the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule. Now imagine the opposite scenario: the evidence is admissible in 
the forum circuit but inadmissible in the search circuit. We might wonder why, 
in this case, the police should get the beneﬁt of the forum rule when they com-
mitted an illegal search in the search circuit. The reason, once again, is that the 
exclusionary rule is about deterrence. In the eyes of the forum circuit, the search 
 
disagreement simply recognizes that a prior decision may apply even if that decision is not on 
all fours with the facts of the case. See Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 
179, 198-99 (2014). 
100. United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D. Conn. 1987). 
101. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). 
102. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1194-95 (1987). 
103. My framework may also raise concerns about prosecutorial forum shopping. For example, if 
prosecutors plan to bring a case in a circuit where a certain type of search is prohibited, they 
may wait and conduct a search in a circuit that permits the search and thus beneﬁt from the 
good-faith exception. But forum shopping can also arise under the current choice-of-law ap-
proach. The federal government may already conduct searches in different circuits in order to 
gain the beneﬁts of more favorable precedent. At least under my framework, courts may be 
able to limit such forum shopping by recognizing that reliance on circuit precedent is not 
always “reasonable.” For example, if the defendant can show that the government waited to 
conduct a search in a particular circuit solely to gain the beneﬁt of that circuit’s precedent, 
then the government’s reliance may no longer be objectively reasonable. See Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (discussing other contexts where reliance was not “reasonable”); see 
also Corr, supra note 3, at 52-55 (discussing a similar solution). 
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was not illegal, so it makes little sense to suppress the evidence. Excluding the 
evidence would not deter illegal conduct—at least according to the forum court. 
One might pause to ask: Why are we shifting between what the search circuit 
thinks and what the forum circuit thinks? Doesn’t this shifting perspective just 
favor the government? Might it undermine the deterrent purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule? In a formal sense, no. What is important to remember is that we 
are always viewing the issue from the perspective of the forum court. In the ﬁrst 
example, the forum court still concludes that the search was illegal; the court just 
cannot provide a suppression remedy because the police lack sufficient culpabil-
ity. This is how the Supreme Court framed the issue in Davis. The Justices did 
not adopt or follow the lower court’s decision. Indeed, they had just ruled two 
years earlier that this exact type of search was illegal. Instead, the Court simply 




By comparison, in the second example, the forum court concludes that the 
search was permissible; the court disregards the precedent of the search circuit. 
This is how the Supreme Court often addresses Fourth Amendment cases. When 
the Justices decide that some investigative technique is permissible, they don’t 
then ask whether evidence should be suppressed because under local circuit 
court precedent the search was unlawful. Instead, the Supreme Court simply 
rules the evidence admissible because, in the Justices eyes, there is no illegal con-
duct to deter. Thus, in both examples, the deciding court—that is, the forum 
court or the Supreme Court—is consistent in evaluating the deterrent beneﬁts of 
the exclusionary rule from its own perspective. 
Looking beyond formal justiﬁcations, I recognize that this uniformly pro-
government result might seem unappealing or even unjust. But to the extent that 
the intercircuit exclusionary rule seems unfair, the critique should be directed at 
the exclusionary rule more broadly. For example, perhaps reliance on circuit 
precedent should not fall within the good-faith exception.
105
 Or perhaps the ex-
clusionary rule should be about more than just deterrence.
106
 These issues go 
well beyond the scope of this Comment. I merely raise them to suggest that any 
perceived unfairness may speak to much deeper issues. By contrast, this Com-
 
104. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243-45 (2011). 
105. See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 
(2011). Indeed, the Supreme Court does not allow defendants to escape criminal liability on 
the basis that they acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding circuit precedent that is 
later overruled. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984); see also Trevor W. 
Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 455 (2001) (critiquing Rodgers). 
106. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 151-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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ment’s project has been modest: to make sense of intercircuit suppression dis-
putes within prevailing understandings of the exclusionary rule and choice of 
law. 
conclusion 
The intercircuit exclusionary rule can help federal courts resolve a narrow 
doctrinal question: how to determine the admissibility of evidence acquired in 
another circuit. Yet the rule also illustrates something important about the rela-
tionship between appellate precedent and choice of law more generally. In short, 
circuit splits do not present a choice-of-law question. And that latter conclu-
sion—grounded in established doctrine and theory—has broader implications 
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